

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

VOLUME 18

2002

NUMBER 1

Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities for Dispute Settlement*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The current mantras under which we operate—no nation-building, no peacekeeping without a ceasefire, no mission creep, need for early warning, exit strategy, among others—have been major causes for the failure to deal effectively with state collapse and deadly conflict in recent years. An examination of thirty instances of missed opportunities in six cases (Lebanon in the 1970s–80s, and Somalia, Liberia, Zaire, Haiti and Yugoslavia mainly throughout the 1990s) shows the need for clearer thinking in analyzing foreign conflict and responses. Such thinking also needs to be grounded in a more accurate notion of international relations than that currently provided by realist notions.

Conflict management is a matter of decision and statesmanship, not of unequivocal rules of operation. At every step of the way, there are difficult choices, involving courage, leadership, and risk. It is always safest to follow the bureaucratic reflex and do nothing, because something might happen to remove the challenge on its own. Usually, however, things only get worse, again posing the challenge to choice.

Yet, the cases of missed opportunity cry out at the top of their voices, with clear lessons to prevent their repetition, many entailing the reversal of elements of current “wisdom” on intervention and conflict management.

- Inaction is a course of high costs and inefficiency. External actors have an interest in early action, where costs are lower and options broader. Even

* Schwartz Lecture on Dispute Resolution at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, delivered April 2, 2002.

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salient solutions to collapse and conflict lose their relevance if not taken in time.

- Adequate measures are needed from the start, rather than minimal measures that are the pathway to entrapment. Continuing human losses and disintegrating regional relations, brought on by state collapse and deadly conflict, inevitably compel external powers to become involved at a later date, when costs are higher and options fewer.

- Promises and predictions need to be backed by threats and warnings. Unless credible worse alternatives are laid out alongside conflict resolution efforts, peace will not appear attractive to parties engrossed in conflict. However, threats feared more by the threatener than by the threatened cannot be credible.

- In internal conflicts, with multiple parties and indistinct battle lines, peacekeeping forces need a peace-enforcement mission and rules of engagement. Waiting for a ceasefire to be fully respected ignores many opportunities for effective intervention to help make a tentative ceasefire stick; sending monitors who cannot engage is an exercise in risk and ineffectiveness.

- Conflict managers need to take the time it takes to finish their job; they should leave as soon as they can but stay as long as they must. Withdrawal dates and fixations on exit strategies are invitations to renewed conflict. Leaving should be the result of a task completed, not the goal of engagement.

- State collapse calls for state- (not nation-) building, or else conflicts resulting from collapse will continue despite the best efforts of the international community and local suppliers.

Let us begin this examination first by defining opportunity, then identifying interest, then developing the early warning/early action problem, and finally turning to excuses and deeper reasons why opportunities were missed. Let us remember too that this is not just an “academic” exercise and that the measures missed were no different (and often less) than those used later or elsewhere.

II. OPPORTUNITIES

Opportunities are favorable moments for achieving a purpose—a suitable combination of conditions for accomplishing a goal. The opportune moment to do something is not just “whenever,” but is contextually determined in relation to the conflict. Interventions require an “entry point” or occasion that invites foreign action. Need alone does not justify action; there must be some definable opening for external parties to enter, and if there is not, it must be created. Opportunities or entry points can be defined by event or by context.

COWARDLY LIONS

Events that require or justify a mediatory reaction can be either scheduled or unscheduled. In a few instances, a scheduled event such as an election requires a response that could make a major difference in the subsequent course of actions. Examples include the fraudulent count announced after the 1985 elections in Liberia, where American rejection would have triggered both internal and external reactions; or the cancellation of the November 1987 elections in Haiti, which occasioned a cut in aid but little more; or the restoration of Aristide in 1994, which was not followed by measures to restore the state as well; or the 1996 elections in Yugoslavia, where the opposition received polite notice from Washington but no help.

More frequently, unscheduled events or crises invite an external response. The 1995 shelling of Sarajevo galvanized the NATO allies into intervention in Bosnia,¹ and the 1991 advances of the Eritrean and Tigrean rebels on Addis Ababa brought in United States mediation.² But neither the 1988 massacre of dispossessed Somali tribesmen in Hargeisa, the 1991 and 1993 military and civilian riots in Kinshasa and other Zairean cities, the 1995 and 1996 pogroms of targeted ethnic groups in the Kivus of eastern Zaire, the 1991 military coup against the elected Haitian government in Port au Prince, nor the 1994 unconstitutional installation of a new president in Haiti brought any effective response. In an event-defined opportunity, scheduled or unscheduled, the response must be immediate; otherwise, the opening closes and the justification appears lame.

When there is no event, scheduled or unexpected, to require a response, the opportunity is to be found more broadly in the context of the conflict. Significantly, this is the more frequent case. The established model indicates that a ripe moment for initiating mediation is composed of a mutually hurting stalemate, out of which parties seek or are responsive to help in extricating themselves.³ Such a stalemate was seized on occasion—by the All-African Council of Churches in 1972, when the southern and northern Sudanese

¹ RICHARD HOLBROOKE, *TO END A WAR* 91–93 (1998).

² HERMAN J. COHEN, *INTERVENING IN AFRICA: SUPERPOWER PEACEMAKING IN A TROUBLED CONTINENT* 17–59 (2000).

³ See generally I. William Zartman, *The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts*, in *MANAGING US-SOVIET RIVALRY* 341 (Alexander L. George ed., 1983); I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, *RIPE FOR RESOLUTION* (1989); I. William Zartman, *Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula, and Mediation*, in *PERSPECTIVES ON NEGOTIATION* 205 (Diane B. Bendahmane & John W. McDonald, Jr. eds., 1986); I. William Zartman, *Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond*, in *INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR* 225 (Paul Stern & Daniel Druckman eds., 2000).

armies bogged down in civil war;⁴ by the United States in 1987, when the UNITA-South African and Cuban-Angolan armies checked each other at Cuito Carnevale;⁵ by Portugal in 1990, when the opposing forces in Angola fought to an impasse at Mavinga;⁶ by Sant' Egidio and supporters in 1990, when drought and destruction brought the Mozambican civil war to a deadlock.⁷

Parties to conflicts have repeatedly allowed ripe moments to slip away as evidenced by the following: in Lebanon in March 1978, July 1982 and March 1984, factions engaged in a civil war were deadlocked and hurting but not helped out of their impasse; in Liberia in June 1990, in April 1992 or July 1993, parties were brought to a ceasefire but no effective measures for ending the conflict. Other instances when ripe moments for conflict resolution were missed existed in June 1990 when the Yugoslav republics were deadlocked over the future of the federation, in October 1998 when the Serbian government and the Kosovars were at an impasse over the Kosovo issue, and in Somalia in March-June 1991 just after Siad Barre's fall. A mutually hurting stalemate may motivate conflicting parties themselves to negotiation but it is often the vehicle for third party intervention if the parties are not motivated to seize the moment on their own.⁸

But in some instances, there was only a soft stalemate with a painful but bearable effect, and the interveners were required to create an event or an opportunity to justify their action.⁹ Intervention therefore had to be sold to the conflicting parties themselves (as well as to the interveners' public); it was a lifebuoy thrown to a swimmer rather enjoying the excitement of the surf and oblivious to the approaching tidal wave that was visible to the thrower. The image shows that a soft stalemate requires third party

⁴ See HIZKIAS ASSEFA, *MEDIATION OF CIVIL WARS* 95-135 (1987).

⁵ See CHESTER A. CROCKER, *HIGH NOON IN SOUTHERN AFRICA* 353-72 (1992); ZARTMAN, *RIPE FOR RESOLUTION* *supra* note 3, at 170-254 (1989).

⁶ See Donald Rothchild & Caroline Hartzell, *Interstate and Intrastate Negotiations in Angola*, in *ELUSIVE PEACE* 175, 190 (I. William Zartman ed., 1995).

⁷ See Ibrahim Msabaha, *Negotiating an End to Mozambique's Murderous Rebellion*, in *ELUSIVE PEACE*, *supra* note 6, at 204, 221-27.

⁸ See generally Saadia Touval & William Zartman, *International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era*, in *TURBULENT PEACE* 427, 434-35 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2002).

⁹ See I. William Zartman, *Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts*, in *ELUSIVE PEACE*, *supra* note 6, at 3, 18-20; Msabaha, *supra* note 7, at 231, 231-35; Imtiaz H. Bakhari, *International Negotiations Among Many Actors: Afghanistan*, in *ELUSIVE PEACE*, *supra* note 7, at 231, 231-35.

intervention, even more than does a hard or hurting stalemate.¹⁰ In these instances, the opportunity is artificial, to be constructed out of the unstable conflict or impending collapse before it really blows up at a less convenient time for both conflicting parties and vulnerable bystanders. “You’re going to be involved willy-nilly,” noted Joseph Alpher of the Mideast conflict in 2001, “and so it is better to take the initiative than be dragged in by some dramatic event, which . . . is almost certainly going to be a negative one.”¹¹

Finally, there are moments of opportunity when the conflict undergoes a momentary calm, opening the possibility of creating a longer lasting, more stable outcome. It is generally evident that measures are needed to make the pause in the conflict permanent by addressing the causes of the conflict and establishing mechanisms to prevent its reoccurrence.¹² The opportunity may come from an informal lull in the conflict, from a more explicit ceasefire, or even from a meeting of the parties. The point is that it offers an opening for specific measures for it is not self-perpetuating and will fall apart at the next incident if not seized and solidified. In half the instances, third parties took advantage of a momentary lull to summon the conflicting parties to a conference to fill the political vacuum and reinstitute the state, but then failed in reality because they did not invest commensurate energy in follow-through.

In sum, the opportunity is defined as a moment in the conflict or collapse when the external party can direct the conflicting parties’ attention to constructive measures. While there is a specific element in the identification of opportunities—an event requiring a response, a stalemate impelling an exit—there is also a huge window for creativity. Opportunities can be inherently precise times or they can be broader time periods within which the particular moment is a matter of perception and creation.

For this analysis, the focus for action is on a third party.¹³ In the end, domestic actors need to be brought back into control, but in state rebirth, as in other delivery processes, midwiving is often necessary. It is true that the parties to the conflict can also confront opportunities and miss them, but a recipe for a different course of action would either have to enter their psyche, where this analysis is not equipped to venture, or enlist a third party to make the argument for change to them. That is where this analysis goes. The objection may be raised that a new course of action for conflict resolution

¹⁰ See Zartman, *supra* note 9, at 10.

¹¹ Lee Hockstader, *US Role as Mideast Mediator Fades to a Whisper*, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2001, at A2.

¹² NEGOTIATING FORWARD-AND-BACKWARD-LOOKING OUTCOMES (Viktor Kremenyuk and I. William Zartman eds., 2001).

¹³ But see BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, *THE MARCH OF FOLLY* (1984).

must also enter a third party's psyche, where it is arguably disadvantaged because it is removed from the arena of conflict. But entry into conflict management through a third party is necessary to circumvent the major problem of the arena, which is the clash between the psychological demands of conflict and of its termination in the minds of the conflicting parties. Parties at conflict need help. They are too taken up with the business of conducting conflict to see the need and opportunities for a way out, unless someone helps them. While conflicted states cannot be either saved by reconstruction or saved from self-destruction by external action alone, external intervention of some sort becomes necessary when conflict becomes stuck in its own mire. Whether taken by one actor or several actors, action must be coordinated, or collective mediation provides its own undoing.

Four criteria—minimal-rewrite, prior-mention, feasibility-relevance, and contextual opportunity—have yielded thirty instances in the six cases where an opportunity was arguably missed. The distribution of missed opportunities is significant. It suggests that opportunities may come in bunches, after which the chance for openings has passed, as in Zaire and Somalia. Contrarily, it suggests that opportunities may come at intervals in the conflict or the collapsing process, each slightly different and producing a new stage of conflict and collapse, as in Lebanon, Haiti, and earlier Somalia. It also suggests that missed opportunities can destroy the solution that was salient at the time, so that good ideas can be worn out without even being tried, as in the last days of Yugoslavia. Finally, it suggests that there are uninhabited spaces in the evolution of the conflict or process of collapse when simply nothing can be done, and that there were no opportunities to miss in Somalia after the end of the US-UN intervention in 1993, in Congo (Zaire) during the time of Laurent Kabila, or in Kosovo up to 1998.

Missed opportunities are not merely missed moments; they tend to be failures to gain entry into a whole phase of a conflict, after which entry is no longer or much more rarely possible, and the phase changes into something less penetrable. Opportunities are not revolving doors, where entry appears at regular intervals. They constitute a period of time in the life of the conflict when preventive diplomacy is possible and after which entry becomes much more difficult. Not only opportunities, but whole periods of opportunity were missed in Yugoslavia, Liberia, Haiti, Somalia, and Zaire-Congo. Consequently, these countries and their citizens, the regions, and the external powers have had to live with the consequences.

III. INTEREST

Need is not opportunity, but opportunity is not interest. For an opportunity to be seized or missed, a third party must have an interest in involvement. The enormous losses that missed opportunities entail, and their effect on regional or global relations, provide a humanitarian interest in intervention. Realists, to the contrary, would argue that humanitarian interest is not a negligible concern for the United States. Whether in the Cold War or in regional conflicts, states act to protect and advance their values, not just their structural position. The importance of human life to the American system of values gives humanitarian interest a special salience. As American inaction on the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and official attempts to avoid the “G-word” demonstrate, humanitarian interest and the value of human life anywhere is not absolute, but it is strong. Joseph Nye has indicated that “[a] democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a morality-based and an interest-based foreign policy. Moral values are simply intangible interests,” and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has denied the distinction between “promoting our values [and] pursuing our interests.”¹⁴

Incredibly, the fate of Lebanon, Somalia, Zaire, Yugoslavia, Liberia and Haiti have, on crucial occasions, not been considered of interest to the United States, Europe, or their own regions, nor has the importance of their announced collapse to the fate of their region in general been deemed worthy of motivating U.S., European or neighbors’ involvement. If the loss of 500,000 Yugoslav lives, 500,000 Somalis, 150,000 Liberians, 120,000 Lebanese, 100,000 Zaireans, and 5,000 Haitians as a result of direct killings at the hands of their own countrymen does not provide a compelling humanitarian interest, it is not because these losses were not foreseeable and foretold. If humanitarian interest was not enough motivation, the importance of each case in regard to American and other Western foreign policy values such as good governance, democracy, regional stability, economic accountability and access, and external responsibility should have been.

But even for those who hold to the distinction between values and interests, there is a national or strategic interest in managing deadly conflict and state collapse. Collapsed states tend to be vacuums, drawing in outside forces to fill the empty political space. That space is then occupied by regional conflict, perpetuating the state collapse, exacerbating the domestic

¹⁴ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Human Rights and the National Interest: A Different Kind of World Wide Web* (Aug. 14, 2002), available at <http://www.lchr.org/itni>.

conflict, extending the regional conflict, and forcing extra-regional powers to take sides against their interests. If the struggle to occupy the vacuum engages neighbors in pursuit of their interests, it is broadly in the interest of outside powers to see the collapsed state recover and take care of its own affairs.

This argument is sometimes turned on its head to justify support for dictators, who supposedly block the way to state collapse. But those who proclaim "Mobutu or chaos" should remember "Après moi le déluge."¹⁵ The cited cases show that dictators cause state collapse, a finding that democrats should find obvious. Finding stability in dictatorship is like the man who jumped off the roof finding the going "so far, so good" at the 29th floor; the crash at the end is inevitable. The cases show that the argument that measures to replace the dictator might have made things worse is specious: it is hard to imagine consequences much worse than what happened.

External powers' generic interest in other areas is generally summarized under the headings of *stability* and *access*. These elements are of particular relevance to the United States because of the worldwide scope of its interests. Undeniably, deadly conflict and state collapse impede commercial and diplomatic access to a country and destroy its stability. While this defines a general terrain for interest, it does not provide a finer screen to discriminate between opportunities that justify action and those that do not. Three more fine-meshed aspects of interest are *responsibility*, *subsidiary*, and *effectiveness*.

Responsibility comes from the following three sources: history, ability, and policy. The first two are structural, unchanged by whether a party presently acts or not, whereas the third is dependent on recent action. Responsibility also derives from the ability to affect events, whether exercised or not, such as the responsibility that prompted parliamentary inquiry in France and Belgium for inaction and complicity in the Rwandan genocide (and was never pursued beyond the media in the United States, which also had Rwandan blood on its hands). Policy responsibility derives from previous actions related to the cause of the problem underlying the conflict and collapse, such as U.S. responsibility in Zaire for having put Mobutu in power and supported him ever since, or Syria's responsibility for stability in Lebanon after its armed interventions.

Intervention to evacuate Doe in 1991 was turned down when Deputies Meeting chair Robert Gates "refused to recognize any special [United States] responsibility for Liberia's crisis on the basis of our historical ties,"¹⁶ or, as

¹⁵ *Contra* MICHAEL G. SCHATZBERG, *MOBUTU OR CHAOS* (1991).

¹⁶ COHEN, *supra* note 2, at 143.

Secretary Baker put it in regard to Yugoslavia, “We don’t have a dog in this fight.”¹⁷ Although the judgment in both cases was shown by later events to be flawed, they both illustrate the terms of interest involved. When Deputy Secretary Eagleburger turned down proposals for evacuating Mobutu and Doe because he did not want the United States to be responsible for the unknown, he was doubtless aware of the U.S. responsibility for putting Mobutu in power in 1965 and certifying Doe’s election in 1985 in the first place. But he missed the point that Africa and the world held the United States responsible for the mess in Zaire and Liberia because it had the ability to do something but did not. And when President George Bush allegedly said that he did not want to be responsible for putting an escaped convict in charge of Liberia, referring to Taylor, he was expressing the fear of establishing an even firmer responsibility for Liberian events than already existed. But the responsibility conferred by ability, especially when reinforced by history and past policy, is hard to shake, and soon brought the United States back into the fray with financial support for the Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), belying the original judgment. In both cases, the United States was held responsible for events, and found it indeed had a beaten dog in the fight.

Subsidiarity prioritizes different levels of responsibility. It indicates that problems should be handled at the lowest effective level, and hence that conflict and collapse should be dealt with first regionally before becoming a global responsibility. Subsidiarity was found to be necessary to the workings of the European Union and its spirit has permeated U.N. discussions. “Yugoslavia is a European problem” and “African solutions for African conflicts” are two expressions of subsidiary responsibility.

Subsidiarity is not without its own debate. While neighbors know the territory better than foreigners, they also have their own interests which may dictate solutions that are not necessarily in the best interest of the conflicted country. Yet collective neighborhood attention, as opposed to single-state intervention, spreads responsibility and tempers narrow interests. Furthermore, subsidiarity has been challenged in the neighborhood as an expression of outside neglect and disinterest—or irresponsibility—often in the same breath as outside attention has been decried as external interference. As in the matter of responsibility, subsidiarity is not self-interpreting; it only indicates the terrain of debate in defining interest.

Effectiveness is the third element in interest, a point of prudence to restrain the hell-bound best intentions. There is no point in opportunistic

¹⁷ Blaine Harden, *The World: Rule of Force; In Africa, a Lesson in How Not to Keep the Peace*, N. Y. TIMES, May 14, 2000, § 4, at 1.

intervention if the intervenor does not have the necessary resources or if the intervention will be obdurately refused. For this reason, ripeness is included in the identification of an opportunity; there is no point in leading the horse to water if it absolutely is not thirsty. Effectiveness, too, is a function of effort deployed; some of the most prominent reasons for the ineffectiveness of attempts to use opportunities are shortsighted satisfaction with superficial results, weariness before sustained effort, and unwillingness to stay engaged.

Effectiveness cannot be taken as a counsel of perfection. The notion, at the heart of PDD 25 and subsequent US peacekeeping engagements, that there must be an effective ceasefire before monitoring missions can be undertaken raises the bar of effectiveness unrealistically high and contributes to the cowardly reputation of the putative King of the Jungle. In a world of internal conflict with disorganized rebel groups and ineffective governments, a peace-enforcement mission and rules of engagement are necessary components of peacekeeping; thinking otherwise is to continue to operate in a bygone world of functioning states making ceasefires with their sovereign authority.

The debate on the advisability of seizing the proposed opportunities is a matter of judgment; it is that judgment which is questioned here. In many cases, the soundness of the judgment was denied by events themselves—by subsequent reruns of the debates which ended in attempts to seize an opportunity that had already passed. Thus, the weight of history in the middle run frequently overrides the authority of history in the short run, when it tries to assert that the judgments of the time were sound appreciations of the only way to proceed. As history shows, opportunities were missed according to the very criteria by which they were turned down; the parties showed bad judgment on the basis of their own criteria. Delay caused the actions of external powers to be made under less favorable circumstances with greater effort and less effect, in Yugoslavia, Haiti, Liberia, Lebanon, and Somalia. Delay also foreclosed certain courses of action for external parties in Zaire.

IV. EARLY AWARENESS AND EARLY ACTION

The strongest reason for early action, when options are still available, is that later action is more expensive, forced and constrained; inaction is costly in its consequences. In all of the cases, the US—to focus on the leading country—was obliged to enter the conflict late, after having avoided chances to take lesser action earlier. When it finally adopted a policy, substantial damage had already been done. Many of the deaths and displacements were accompanied by frightful human abuses—rapes, massacres, destruction of

COWARDLY LIONS

homes and places of worship, and other brutalities. These are some of the costs that need to be calculated in making the decision not to act.

These losses had even greater secondary effects. Socially and psychologically, they left deeply scarred and wounded people. Groups who had been mobilized by memories of past atrocities were wounded by new carnage committed by individuals currently living among or beside their victims. Turks, Ustashe, Tonton Macouts, Hutu and Tutsi, Banyarwanda, Ogadenis-Marehans-Dulbahantes, Krahns, Gios and Manos, and others stepped out of history and confirmed the sometimes dim and distant myths of the past. Reconciliation became an additional burden for the conflict resolution process, justice vied with peace, and trust and cooperation lay dead with the victims.

Society was also shattered by the conflict. Population displacement destroyed the social tissue, traditional norms of respect and authority were trashed, and social institutions such as church and school were left in ruins. Social geography, patterns, and structures were seriously altered in generally unproductive and antagonistic ways; societies generally underwent leveling and proletarianizing, with massive influxes into the cities. The new leadership tended to appeal to, be representative of, and derive its support from this new social sector. The youth suffered tremendously in all of the countries, with heavy implications for the future. Education was interrupted, unemployment became endemic, drugs took hold, and child soldiers were scarred in their formative years. This is not just a litany of the evil effects of civil strife; it is a specific list of social dislocations resulting from a conflict left to run its course, through missed opportunities for its management.

Furthermore, the conflicts destroyed national as well as personal economies. It was not simply that some buildings were destroyed and needed rebuilding, or that some people lost their jobs or even savings. The entire national economic systems of the six countries were demolished. Haiti was set back decades, denuded of its industry and topsoil.¹⁸ Reconstruction in Lebanon was estimated at \$45 billion for the years 1977, 1983, and the 1990s alone.¹⁹ Liberia's GDP growth has been consistently negative since the arrival of Doe to power, which accounts for Taylor's reliance on his diamond

¹⁸ Kumar, Chetan, *Peacebuilding in Haiti*, in *PEACEBUILDING AS POLITICS* 21, 21–52 (Elizabeth Cousnes & Chetan Kumar eds., NY International Peace Academy, 2001).

¹⁹ The only years for which figures are available; figures from the Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction and the Arab Development Fund; SALIM NASR, GEORGE IRANI AND JAMES SAMS, *WORKING PAPER CONFERENCE ON LEBANON*, 97–98 (American Task Force on Lebanon ed., Washington D.C. 1991).

habit.²⁰ Zaire's formal economy virtually collapsed during the same period; the remaining part of its infrastructure that had not disintegrated from mismanagement and neglect was destroyed in the riots of the early 1990s, and anything left or added since was again demolished in the civil wars of 1996–97 and 1998–2002.²¹ While the prosperous parts of Yugoslavia hived off in the early 1990s, secluding the nation's wealth, the rest of the former republic has continued to disintegrate.²² Somalia, never well off, has simply returned to subsistence.²³ The countries, which were originally poor, became even more miserable.

Normally the list of costs stops here, or earlier, but the collapse of a third sector—the political sector—also bears heavy consequences.²⁴ When the state is privatized, as in Zaire/Congo and Liberia, or pulverized, as in Somalia, or drawn and quartered, as in Yugoslavia, or contested, as in Lebanon, or hijacked, as in Haiti, it loses its legitimacy as well as its ability to function. Collapsed states are not simply rebuilt like a fallen statehouse portico; they need reconstruction from the foundations. Not only is it a long and complex job, but it is also a void that foreign forces and international institutions cannot adequately fill. The rapacious practices of Milosevic, Duvalier, Siad Barre, Mobutu and Doe made it hard to find successors with a civic spirit and sense of government. There is no one to conduct business as usual during remodeling. The problem with state reconstruction—unlike economic and even social reconstruction—is not state reconstruction per se, but that there is no state to hold activities together while reconstruction is going on.

But the final element of cost was for the reluctant intervenor. The argument is usually made that the loss of 216 Marines in Lebanon in 1982, or 18 Rangers and special forces in Somalia in 1993, or the threatened danger to the policemen aboard the Harlan County in 1993 and to the Troika's troops offshore from Kinshasa in 1991 and 1993, demonstrate the cost of intervention and provide proof of its inadvisability. However, that argument is upside down. These costs show the need for even earlier preventative action.

In all of these cases, not only was it expensive to delay effective action in the conflict, it became impossible later to avoid involvement, with further

²⁰ WILLIAM RENO, *WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES* 79–113 (Lynne Reinner ed., Boulder 1998).

²¹ *Id.* at 147–55, 174–76.

²² SUSAN L. WOODWARD, *BALKAN TRAGEDY* (1995).

²³ *LEARNING FROM SOMALIA* (Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst eds., 1997).

²⁴ I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, *COLLAPSED STATES* (1995).

expensive consequences. After the U.S. had dithered through the evolving Yugoslav disintegration in the early 1990s, it was unavoidably drawn in to handle the consequences in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia in the second half of the decade. After the U.S. pursued its contradictory appreciations of the Haitian crisis in the early 1990s, it was finally obliged to use full force in the middle of the decade; the U.S. declared victory and went back home. The U.S. and its Troika partners found themselves obliged to reckon with an intransigent, paranoid successor in dealing with Kabila's Congo after they avoided decisive measures at the beginning and into the middle of the 1990s in dealing with Mobutu's Zaire. The international community felt compelled to engage in truly shocking events in the successor situation after it had only looked on with shock at the final paroxysms of Siad Barre's regime—as the anguished discussions at the end of the Bush and the beginning of the Clinton administrations demonstrate.²⁵ If external actors had continued to ignore these conflicts and collapses indefinitely, then the missed opportunities would only be humanitarian losses. But because the United States and other outside players eventually feel obliged to get involved when the situation is worse, early engagement becomes a matter of interest.

V. EXCUSES

In all thirty instances of missed opportunities in the six collapsing states, early warnings were more than adequate, proposed measures would likely have been successful, and the cost of collapse in terms of lives and money may have been much less than the final actual costs. In half the instances, the policy proposals involve merely strengthening initiatives that have already been taken. So why were the opportunities missed?

The most specific reason is that the measures were contrary to the policy supporting the status quo, even as the status quo was falling apart. The United States long held to the policy of “Mobutu or Chaos” and the whole Troika worked hard to make that mantra come true.²⁶ Like Mobutu, Doe was long viewed as a bulwark against communism, and his regime's assistance in giving the United States a toehold in West Africa was viewed with gratitude. In Haiti, U.S. policy and opinion was sharply divided between supporters of Haitian business and advocates of Haitian populist democracy; this dulled the thrust of any effort to secure a rapid return of President Aristide. Thus, in

²⁵ Maryann Cusimano, *Operation Restore Hope: The Bush Administration's Decision to Intervene in Somalia* (Georgetown University: Pew Case Studies).

²⁶ SCHATZBERG, *supra* note 15; Lisa Pachter, *Our Man in Kinshasa* (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University) (on file with The Johns Hopkins University).

many cases, the safe status quo was preferred to risky change and as a consequence, these states continued to slide down the slippery slope toward collapse. A well-crafted alternative that reduces risk and follows through with supports and controls is needed to counter the costly policy favoring the status quo.

Another reason opportunities were missed was a fear of casualties. The official fear of military deaths was encouraged by the Bush administration as early as 1991 by the manner the Gulf War was touted; the fear was then played to the hilt by the Clinton administration. Instead of developing such themes as leadership, post-Cold War order, U.N. usefulness to American objectives, regional security regimes, protection of human rights, and values as interest, the United States, joined by other Western countries, hid behind its own rhetoric about casualties even when the danger of deaths was minimal. As a result, it allowed forces of disorder and spirals of violence to prove its point. A little exemplary firmness in Liberia, Somalia, and Yugoslavia in 1990 or in Liberia, Somalia, Zaire, Yugoslavia, and Haiti in 1991 would have involved few or no troops and would have forestalled much larger troop use and danger later. The absence of such a response showed the forces of disorder in these countries that their actions were unchecked. Thus, a firm response not only inhibits specific disorder in the short run, but it also inhibits its escalation in the long run.

A third reason for the missed opportunities was a lack of mediation skills. Frequently, as in Lebanon, Liberia, and Somalia, mediation was attempted but failed because it was not well conducted. There were no skilled authoritative mediators, often because of a shortage of experience and training in the tough business of preventive diplomacy (especially in West Africa and the Middle East). Keeping the parties engaged, devising trade-offs, thinking through consequences and follow-through, working out details, installing dispute-resolution mechanisms, developing ties and relationships, were skills, which were absent in crucial conferences of the parties. Provision of a skilled mediator was required to complement the demarche.

Inhibitions also derived from Cold War considerations in the late 1980s and Gulf War concerns in the early 1990s. But usually Cold War inhibitions on the U.S. side were the result of a bogus calculation. Support and participation in the Damascus and Lausanne negotiations would have left the United States in a stronger position in the Middle East, particularly with Syria, which was claimed as an ally by the Soviet Union, but also with Saudi Arabia, Muslims, and Christians in Lebanon. The idea that Doe and Barre were bulwarks against communism in Africa, which was invoked to inhibit preventive diplomacy in 1985 and 1988, respectively, is farfetched especially in light of the fact that neither of their oppositions were communist.

The Gulf War blocked U.S. and U.N. attention to a number of promising demarches in two major directions. It monopolized official attentions, leaving no space for dealing with other issues, and it dominated the possibilities of building alliances and coalitions in 1991, since the United States was already too deeply in political debt to its allies on the Gulf front to be able to contract additional debts on other issues. Yet, the judgment that the United States can only handle one crisis at a time is simply not true in the absolute, since the United States has frequently been called on to deal with “two front” diplomacy.²⁷ Yet, these very considerations should have worked in the other direction. Given that the proposed preventive diplomacy demarches were not of crisis magnitude, authority to deal with them should have been delegated and they should have been handled, with support from the Assistant Secretary and Regional Bureau level, before they became crises.²⁸

VI. FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the last analysis, the major reasons for missed opportunities lie at the feet of some of the leading tenets of conflict management in the post-Cold War era. These reasons include a paralyzing worry over mission creep, a fixation on exit strategy, a fear of military engagement and casualties, an aversion to “nation-building,” and most broadly, an unwillingness to bear the responsibilities of international leadership in the post-Cold War era. These policies and attitudes have hampered effective action and allowed opportunities to slip away in blood, only to reappear as impositions at times when it is most difficult to adhere to them.

The impending baggage begins with the fear of mission creep, which is derived from the inability to foresee the needs of the mission and to prepare for it adequately. Mission creep is indeed a real danger—a form of the serious problem of entrapment;²⁹ of course mission creep is not advocated here, but instead appropriate mission preparation to avoid it. Mission creep is the result of poor planning—of not taking adequate measures to handle the problem initially and of not understanding the potential for escalation if this is not done; it is not the result of surprises during the mission. The following are examples of the many ways in which shortsighted plans create their own

²⁷ Fareed Zakaria, *The Superpower that Couldn't Say No*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, § 4, at 17.

²⁸ See CHESTER A. CROCKER, HIGH NOON IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 465–82 (1992).

²⁹ See JOEL BROCKNER & JEFFERY Z. RUBIN, ENTRAPMENT IN ESCALATING CONFLICTS (1985); Paul Meerts, *Escalation and Entrapment*, in ESCALATION AND NEGOTIATION (I. William Zartman & Guy Olivier Faure eds., 2003).

pressure for either embarrassing entrapment or shame-faced withdrawal: sending in peacekeeping missions when peace-enforcing missions are required, setting up rules of engagement inappropriate to the announced task of disarmament or relief delivery, conceiving of ceasefire as the end of the mission when sustained engagement is necessary, believing that restoration or election of a president is the end of the state-building process.

Exit strategies, too, are necessary. But when they become the criterion for the success of action, rather than its reward, they mistake the prize for the race; one does not do a job to go home, but instead gets to go home after having done the job. The problem returns to a definition of the job and a realization that maintaining security takes more than six months in Bosnia or thirty days in Macedonia, and that is well known ahead of time.³⁰ Trumpeting the exit strategy and the withdrawal date before the operation begins not only encourages the combatants to hide their arms until the intervention times expire, but also trains the public to expect early disengagement. In addition, it trains the public all over again to distrust their political leaders when they make such untenable promises. All that is well at inception.

The pressure for exit strategies is an overreaction to two reasonable problems. Again, one is the fear of entrapment. There is an understandable concern that it always appears to require more time to finish the job. The other is the historic record, as in the two decades of earlier U.S. occupation of Haiti (1915–1934) that the Haitians have not forgotten, that demonstrates to the difficulty of extracting forces originally installed to overcome disorder. Such concerns are healthy. But, they can be taken into account without overreaction. The guideline should be “stay as long as you must, leave as soon as you can.” At the bottom of it all, overcoming conflict and rebuilding authority are responsibilities of the people involved and cannot be accomplished by outsiders. Too much directive outside presence is quickly resented and counterproductive—a uniting cause for resistance to the intervenor’s best intentions. The exact line between “can” and “must” will vary in each case, but judgment errs when only one of the limits is used as the criterion.

Similarly, the fear of bodybags as a criterion for engagement mistakes a legitimate concern for a predominant guideline; it has also made the U.S. military an object of derision and a threat of silk. The lesson of Somalia for the United States was one of non-engagement, but the lesson of Somalia abroad was that the U.S. military can easily be defeated because a few

³⁰ See generally Gideon Rose, *The Exit Strategy Delusion*, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 56.

casualties will cause it to withdraw. That is a sad state indeed. Yet, the attitude has been consistently instilled and propagated, not just by the military, but also by the concerns of political leaders for protecting U.S. soldiers rather than U.S. interests. Political leaders have not been articulate in showing how the proliferation of anarchic orders in East, West and Central Africa, in the Caribbean and the Andes, and in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Levant creates a world that is not in the United States' best interest. Anarchy spreads, not because some people are not "civilized" or suffer "primordial conflicts," or because its forces are too powerful, but because legitimate order is not defended. Such defense will entail bodybags on occasion, but those who fill them need an inspiring justification from their political leaders that ending deadly conflict and preventing state collapse is a worthy task in the interest of their country.

The final misplaced criterion is the aversion to "nation-building."³¹ The problem is so badly misconceived that its authors do not even know what their term means; nation-building is a longstanding concept referring to the creation of a single object of identification and allegiance out of component social groups, or turning traditional societies into modern nations.³² Although foreign mediators and intervenors can undertake actions that contribute to building national identity as a final goal, it is rather difficult for them to take on directly the essentially domestic work of building a nation. What they can and must help do is to build the state, the institutions, functions, and authorities on which local efforts can then develop a sense of belonging and ownership as they rebuild their nation.

The most important lesson of this exercise is that conflict management requires state-building, and that thinking of one without the other is condemning the prevention of deadly conflict to futility. It is impossible to call a truce to deadly disorder and expect it to hold without engaging in the process of restoring order. To overcome the destructive effects of conflict and the ruins of collapse, states need focused and sustained attention, otherwise the conflict will burst forth again, building on the bitterness, blood and penury that its earlier round created.³³ Internal war ceasefires are not the same as interstate truces; they are not made between ongoing, functioning agencies that can apply the agreements' provisions while running their own affairs, but they are made between weak, exhausted, wounded parties without

³¹ See generally NATION-BUILDING (Karl W. Deutsch & William J. Foltz eds., 1963).

³² See generally *id.*; Fred W. Riggs, *The Theory of Political Development*, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS 317 (James C. Charlesworth ed., 1967).

³³ Paul Collier, Risk and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, paper presented to the International Studies Association, 2001.

the power or authority to monitor their own implementations. For conflict-management devices to work, the states must be restored.

Once they are given their start, states can grow into their functions—a growth that has no determined final nature or fixed limit. But, their start, or re-start, needs assistance. The parties emerging from conflict and collapse do not take over functioning structures, reliable institutions, working bureaucracies, or recognized authorities. The very purpose of the civil conflict is to destroy the authority of the state; when the conflict ends, by convocation or by deposition, that authority needs to be restored, confidence rebuilt, output revived, and the causes and effects of conflict erased. Leaving all this to the unassisted parties is like asking the sick and wounded person to cure himself.

Specifically, this means that the ceasefire must be monitored with muscle and re-mediated when infractions and interpretations reappear. Combatant disarmament and demobilization efforts must be organized and conducted. Individuals must be rehabilitated and economies will need reconstruction. A national army must be recruited out of the various combatant groups, retrained, and given reliable command structures. Local councils must be established under appropriate rules of selection, and must involve civil society and traditional leaders as well as the local combatants' leaders. From these groups, national representative institutions need to be built and filled, and national executive leadership chosen. A police system must be installed. The education system needs quick restoration, which will require local consumer participation, staff replenishment, security assurance, and the location of materials and buildings. Finally, it is very important that all this be done at once, and yet there is no one in charge and capacitated to do it.

Certainly the new political forces within the conflict area are the primary participants in this process, and may even be nominally in charge. But their capacities are lame and limited by the preceding struggle, and they need assistance from an external party to enforce the rules, provide technical capacity, ensure security, supervise reconciliation, jump-start initiatives, give training, and provide resources.

The great American tendency to wait until the mess in a foreign arena is beyond the capacities of local entities, to set it straight in short order and then go back home, is shortsighted and outmoded. The United States showed that it learned this lesson *en gros* in its shift of attitude from the League of Nations after World War I to the United Nations after World War II. But it has not learned the lesson in detail or in specific applications. Even its attitude toward the U.N. is one of suspicion and underutilization. If deadly conflict and state collapse are going to compel U.S. attention *in extremis*, they must also compel both preventive regenerative attention. That means

that the U.S. must pay attention to the reinstatement of a state apparatus, and ensure that it functions well enough to keep the conflict managed, is capable of moving the conflict toward resolution, and prevent its reemergence.

The major reasons for missed opportunities also lie at the feet of some of the leading tenets in the study of international relations, which in turn influence policymakers' thinking on what is possible and desirable. International relations theory is torn between the realist notions of state supremacy and the liberal and constructivist assumptions that the state is increasingly bypassed by a multitude of other actors. To the first, perhaps paradoxically, what is not a state does not matter, and to some, what is not a great power does not matter at all.³⁴ The need to construct and support legitimate authority in the softer areas of the globe where it does not exist is not considered important to the interest of the major states. The liberals and constructivists do not do much better.

In its focus on relative gains, international relations theory, in its dominant realist expression, lends credence to the notion that state collapse and deadly conflict are of interest only to the extent that they affect the competitive standing of the major states vis-à-vis each other.³⁵ From this point of view, support for the debilitating regimes of Doe, Siad Barre, and Mobutu was important to the United States to the extent that it kept out Soviet (and Libyan) influence. Yugoslavia likewise mattered as long as it could be kept out of the Soviet sphere. A State Department official justified support for Doe in the 1985 elections by saying, "We gained five years of support in the Cold War."³⁶ When the Cold War passed, this justification for major state interest passed with it. The end of the Cold War is history, but the legacy it leaves of relative gains deprives conflict control and state restoration of an argument for policymakers' attention.

Relative gains thinking blocked conflict resolution and the restoration of target states in a number of instances including the following: the Fashoda Complex which inhibited French and American cooperation in Zaire and Rwanda, the rivalry between Nigeria and Francophile states over Liberia, the competition for influence between Ethiopia and Egypt over Somalia, the rivalry among the E.C. members over their relative position within the Community and vis-à-vis successor republics of Yugoslavia,³⁷ the strident

³⁴ KENNETH N. WALTZ, *THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS* 72 (1979).

³⁵ See generally Robert Powell, *Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory*, AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1303 (1991).

³⁶ Confidential interview.

³⁷ See generally MICHAEL LIBAL, *LIMITS OF PERSUASION* (1997); HENRY WYNAENDTS, *L'ENGRENAGE* (Paris: Denoel, 1993).

confrontation between India and Pakistan, and the Arab Cold War³⁸ and the Arab-Israeli hot wars over Lebanon. Yet, that resolution and restoration was not in the interest of the blocked states, who were prevented from moving forward in constructive, collective, and evenhanded involvement by the habit of looking over their shoulder at their rivals. International relations theory gives bad advice in taking poor practice for the norm.

The most serious sources of error in international relations theory lie in its weak database. By assuming that what states did is what they will do, it mistakes human choice for scientific input, individual errors for structured determinations, and good or bad decisions for the only decisions possible. Under this view, there are no missed opportunities because state behavior is determined by databased laws. There are a number of examples of state actions that can neither be explained, nor prescriptively analyzed, by this approach, including the U.S. vote on the League of Nations compared with its vote on the U.N., the sides in the debate over NATO enlargement, the failure of the 2000 Camp David mediation between Israel and Palestine, and the repeated failures compared to the ultimate but tardy success of attempts to end the Liberian, Lebanese, Haitian, Mozambican, or Bosnian civil wars. Results are presented as regularities derived from the observation of scientific data, engendering recommendations that the military is the only source of power, relative gains are the only motivation, states are impelled by a drive for power, norms and institutions have no impact on state actions, and values have no role in determining vital interests. Armed with such notions, decision makers feel justified in pursuing narrow understandings of their own possibilities and responsibilities. It is necessary to separate what states do badly from what they do well and to study their decision moments, in order to understand and improve the behavior of statesmen and to learn from their missed opportunities.

But to take advantage of these lessons, political leaders must shed the baggage of the current era which has prevented them from taking timely, decisive action and has left them vulnerable to inescapable pressures to act later when the costs and victims have already accumulated. The United States has been the biggest cowardly lion, although other states' leaders, most notably Europeans, also show the same symptoms at times. The United States has the means to act and the responsibility to do so as "the last remaining superpower." It is that responsibility which must be emphasized. The United States led the "Free World Coalition" in the Cold War for a purpose, not simply as a structural obligation to stop a threatening hegemon.

³⁸ See generally MALCOLM H. KERR, *THE ARAB COLD WAR* (1967); PATRICK SEALE, *THE STRUGGLE FOR SYRIA* (1965).

COWARDLY LIONS

That purpose was to protect and advance a world comprised of states that are free of repression and able to function in ways that enhance the well being of their citizens. These simple goals are what makes action *in extremis* undesirable and what makes early action the wisest course. In the last analysis, early action is the wisest course because action *in extremis* would ultimately be unavoidable due to the role expectations that American values impose on U.S. international action.³⁹

³⁹ It may be argued that action *in extremis* is avoidable, as Rwanda shows. But it is avoidable only at enormous embarrassment and with shamefaced apologies afterward, and all testimony—whatever their sincerity and effectiveness—to the strength of the expectations. As to their sincerity, see I. William Zartman, *An Apology Needs a Pledge*, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at A25.

APPENDIX

Thirty Instances in Six Cases of Missed Opportunities

Lebanon Civil War and State Collapse 1976–84

1.a. January 1976: Militia stalemate and Arab League concern provided an occasion to broaden a Syrian initiative and reinforce the announced Constitutional Document while the civil conflict was still in the hands of civilian politicians.

1.b. November 1979: Withdrawals of external forces, weaknesses in militia leadership, and attempts at internal reform opened a potentiality for coordinated Arab and Lebanese efforts to restore the Lebanese polity.

1.c. July–August 1982: The new unstable situation created by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon provided the opportunity for a different Reagan Initiative that focused on the Lebanese problem, brought in Syria, and worked more deliberately on an internal peace agreement.

1.d. March 1984: Reconciliation sessions at Geneva and Lausanne offered the opportunity for Saudi and American participation along with Syria to add participants, incentives and guarantees to the Lausanne Agreement.

Liberian State Collapse and Civil War 1985–93 and Sierra Leonean Spillover 1998

2.a. October 1985: Fraudulent electoral results after a U.S. warning provided the opportunity for U.S. decertification and support of the true count to end Doe's regime at a time when political forces were still intact and the army not cleansed of anti-Doe forces.

2.b. June 1990: A pause in the fighting and U.S. contacts with both sides provided an opportunity for U.S. evacuation of Samuel Doe to safe retirement in Nigeria or Togo while Charles Taylor held off his attack on Monrovia, thus offering an occasion for influence with Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).

2.c. April–July 1992: A holding ceasefire and an advancing mediation initiative offered the opportunity for inclusion of all factions and stronger mediation role for the Carter Center's International Negotiation Network to provide fuller implementing details and a more realistic monitored disarmament for the Yamoussoukro IV peace agreement.

2.d. July 1993: A new stalemate following intense fighting and a new framework agreement opened the opportunity for the Carter Center International Negotiation Network (INN) and the U.N. Special

COWARDLY LIONS

Representative of the Secretary General (S.R.S.G.) to mediate a realistic disarmament and interim governance agreement.

2.e. July 1998: A stalemate and rainy season lull in the fighting in Sierra Leone, marked by a presidential agreement between Sierra Leone and Liberia, gave an opportunity to redeploy of an augmented Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force along the common border and the diamond areas of Sierra Leone.

Somali State Collapse 1988–93

3.a. October 1988: The Hargeisa massacre provided an opportunity for United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Intergovernmental Agency on Drought and Development (IGADD) condemnation, mediation of monitored ceasefire, and convocation of national reconciliation conference under US-USSR leadership.

3.b. May 1990–January 1991: The call for a sovereign national conference (as practiced elsewhere in Africa) constituted an opportunity for US-Soviet-IGADD mediation of Siad Barre's resignation (such as the United States arranged for Mengistu in March 1991) and leadership transition.

3.c. March–June 1991: Ceasefire and a partial conference at Djibouti offered the possibility of success if complemented by earlier UNSC authorization of UNOSOM I with an arms embargo and a more inclusive Djibouti participation.

3.d. March 1992: A new ceasefire opened the opportunity for rapid UNSC authorization of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping monitors with extended rules of engagement, confidence-building measures and a reconciliation conference, with a broadened mandate for U.N. mediator Mohamed Sahnoun.

3.e. March 1993: The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II required a continuation of UNITAF policies of grassroots institutionalization, agreement enforcement and policing.

3.f. October 1993: The confrontation between the militias and the Delta Force was the opportunity for a firm reaction by U.S. forces in Somalia to deaths at the Aideed corral.

Zairean State Collapse 1991–96

4.a. September 1991: Soldier and civilian riots brought French and Belgian troops to Kinshasa, providing an opportunity to bring Mobutu to hand power to the Sovereign National Conference.

4.b. January–February 1993: Soldier and civilian riots brought French troops to Kinshasa, and the killing of the French ambassador provided an

opportunity to bring Mobutu to hand power to the Sovereign National Conference or to arrest him when he went to France for dental treatment.

4.c. September 1993–January 1994: A number of occasions on the diplomatic and internal Zairean level offered opportunities for U.S. mediation of governmental reform.

4.d. July 1995: Warnings of pogroms in Masisi provided an opportunity for an international effort to halt ethnic violence and move and disarm Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire.

4.e. March 1996: Renewed warnings of pogroms against another the Banyamulenge provided a last opportunity for the UN, the OAU and the Carter Center to mediate to protect the population.

Yugoslav State Collapse 1989–98

5.a. October 1989–March 1990: Croatian, Slovenian, and Serbian insistence on maintaining a (con)federal Yugoslavia provides the opportunity for an international conference under US/EC and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) auspices to work out a satisfactory solution and provide economic support.

5.b. March–July 1991: Impending threat of independence provided the occasion for EC reaffirmation of minority rights conditions for recognition of Croatia and insistence on (con)federal Yugoslavia, with U.S. support within CSCE.

5.c. & d. February–March 1992 and January 1993: U.N. & E.C. démarches, the Cutiliero and Vance-Owens plans, were successive opportunities for United States and EC to guarantee Bosnian integrity.

5.e. September–November 1996: Dayton agreements provided an opportunity to enforce standards on democracy and ethnic treatment that would help prevent violence in Kosovo.

5.f. October 1998: Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and NATO pressure created an opportunity only half-way pursued for meaningful negotiations between the Kosovar and Milosevic on a transitional status for Kosovo.

Haitian State Collapse 1991–96

6.a. October–December 1991: OAS sanctions offered an opportunity for UNSC support and negotiation of coup's reversal, and for tightening of the sanctions during the Cartegena meeting to reverse Aristide's overthrow.

6.b. January–February 1992, OAS mediation gave an opportunity for complementary pressure on Dominican Republic to close borders and enforce sanctions to force the junta to withdraw.

6.c. August–October 1993: The Governor's Island agreement provided the opportunity for a conclusive action through maintenance of the sanctions

COWARDLY LIONS

and insistence on the Harlan County's landing and observance of the Agreement.

6.d. January–July 1996: Maintenance of the constitutional rules for succession opened a last opportunity for a US-led dialog program among government, parties, business, and civic groups to create momentum toward reconstruction programs.

